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BREAKING THE LAW’S
GRIP ON EQUALITY: A
NEW PARADIGM FOR
SECTION 15
Christopher D. Bredt
Adam M. Dodek*

I. INTRODUCTION
Equality is an elusive and sometimes divisive concept. The Supreme Court
of Canada has struggled with the interpretation of equality, tacking back and
forth between periods of unanimity and division in its interpretation of section
15. The late 1980s was a period of unanimity in the Court’s initial attempts to
define the right to equality under section 15, most notably with Law Society of
British Columbia v. Andrews.1 However, within a number of years that
unanimity broke down as the Court fractured into at least three different
approaches to the interpretation of section 15, set out most notably in the 1995
Equality Trilogy.2 By 1999, the Court had returned to unanimity in the Law
decision,3 setting out a complicated multi-factor contextual analysis
conceptually anchored in the idea of human dignity. However, the unanimity of
Law proved to be short-lived. By 2002, Law was beginning to rupture at the
seams, so that in 2003 we are back to where we were less than eight years ago:
* Borden Ladner Gervais LLP Toronto. Christopher Bredt is the National Chair of Borden
Ladner Gervais LLP’s Constitutional Law Practice Group of which Adam Dodek is a member. The
authors would like to express their gratitude to Monique Higham for superb research assistance on
this paper and to Jamie Cameron, Elissa Goodman, Brock Martland, Dwight Newman, Josh Paterson and John Pottow for reading earlier drafts of this article and providing helpful comments.
1
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter “Andrews”].
2
Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 [hereinafter “Miron”]; Thibaudeau v. Canada,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 627 [hereinafter “Thibaudeau”]; and Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [hereinafter “Egan”] (collectively the “Equality Trilogy”).
3
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [hereinafter “Law”].
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section 15 jurisprudence is entangled in an overly-complicated analysis which
produces a high degree of uncertainty. It is not without cause that the Chief
Justice of Canada has termed equality “the most difficult right.” 4
In this paper, we argue for a revised approach to the interpretation of section
15. We argue that section 15 has become overly “contextualized” which has
two effects, both negative. First, the emphasis on context in section 15 has
made interpreting equality more elusive than ever, losing the sort of certainty
and predictability that is an important element of the rule of law under our
Constitution. Second, Law’s penchant for context has essentially eviscerated
any role for section 1, which is the proper place where the balancing of interests
should take place.
This paper has five parts in addition to this introduction. In Part II, we trace
the evolution of the Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence up until Law. In
Part III, we analyze and critique the Law decision and its aftermath.5 In Part IV,
we identify four key principles relevant to the analysis of equality. We then
apply these principles in Part V where we propose a simplified, less contextual
approach to section 15 which is more akin to the test the Supreme Court
originally articulated in Andrews. More particularly, we argue that in analyzing
a claim brought under section 15, the Court should apply the following
framework: first, the inquiry under section 15 should be confined to two
questions: (i) does the law have either the purpose or effect of disadvantaging
the claimant; and (ii) is the disadvantage drawn on the basis of one or more
enumerated or analogous grounds; and second, if a prima facie violation of
section 15(1) is found, the inquiry should move to section 1 where the
government bears the burden of justifying the reasonableness of the restriction
on equality. In articulating this test, we argue that all considerations of
reasonableness are properly considered under section 1 and not under section

4
The Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, P.C., “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001) 14
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d), 17.
5
See Christopher D. Bredt & Ira Nishisato, “The Supreme Court’s New Equality: A Critique” (2000) 8 Canada Watch 16; Christopher D. Bredt & Adam M. Dodek, “The Increasing
Irrelevance of Section 1 of the Charter” (2001) 14 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d), 175, at 181-82. Numerous
others have criticized Law: see e.g. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1997), vol. 2, at para. 52.7(b); Beverly Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting
Equality” (2000) 11 Const. F. 65; Sheilagh Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and
Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299, at 319-32; June Ross, “The Supreme Court’s New
Equality Test: A Critique” (September-October 2000) 8 Can. Watch 16; Jamie Cameron, “A Work
in Progress: The Supreme Court and the Charter’s Equation of Rights and Limits” in Debra M.
McAllister & Adam M. Dodek, eds., The Charter at Twenty: Law and Practice 2002 (Toronto:
OBA, 2002) 31; Lori Sterling, “The Impact of Lovelace v. Ontario on Section 15 of the Charter”
(2001) 14 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 53, at 59-60.
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15(1). Finally, in Part VI we offer some concluding comments on the
challenges of section 15.

II. THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 15 JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence has constantly been a work in
progress. To date there have been four identifiable periods in section 15
adjudication: (1) the early period, defined by Andrews and subsequent cases;
(2) the fragmentation of equality, defined by the Equality Trilogy; (3) the
ascension of unanimity and the Law decision; and (4) the post-Law breakdown
of unanimity. This section will analyze the first two periods in the development
of the Supreme Court’s section 15 jurisprudence.
1. Equality’s Early Years: 1982-1995
Section 15 provides:
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

The first period in the development of equality jurisprudence under the
Charter is also the longest. While the Charter came into force on April 17,
1982, section 15’s enactment was delayed for three years to give provincial and
federal governments time to review their statute books and bring legislation
into compliance with the new equality guarantee. 6 The fundamental difficulty in
this exercise was that section 15 had never been judicially considered and it
was very difficult for government legal advisors to predict how it would be
interpreted.7 Thus, the first Supreme Court decision on section 15 was not
released until February 1989, over half-way through this initial period.
6

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the “Charter”].
7
See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at
797 [hereinafter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed.]. Professor Hogg identified the
central problem with this mandate; it was difficult to provide any sort of confident opinion as to
whether any given law would infringe s. 15 before that section had been judicially considered. Id. It
would have been interesting and perhaps more helpful if the federal government had directed a
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In Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews,8 McIntyre J. set out the
Court’s initial approach to section 15.9 After reviewing various attempts to
define discrimination, McIntyre J. articulated discrimination under section 15 in
the following terms:
I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether
intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the
individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or
disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which
withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits or advantages available to other
members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an
individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the
charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual’s merits and capacities
will rarely be so classed.10

Justice McIntyre reviewed three possible approaches to section 15(1). The
first, proffered by Professor Peter Hogg in the 1985 edition of Constitutional
Law of Canada,11 would treat every distinction drawn by law as discrimination
under section 15(1) which must be justified under section 1. The second
approach was one that McLachlin J.A. (as she then was) had put forward in the
B.C. Court of Appeal in Andrews and involved a consideration of the
reasonableness and fairness of the impugned legislation under section 15(1). 12
Justice McIntyre preferred a third approach, the “enumerated or analogous
grounds” approach under which discrimination for the purpose of section 15(1)
is generally expressed by the enumerated grounds: “Section 15(1) is designed
to prevent discrimination based on these and analogous grounds.” 13
Having defined discrimination in this manner, McIntyre J. explained that
“[a] complainant under section 15(1) must show not only that he or she is not
receiving equal treatment before and under the law or that the law has a
differential impact on him or her in the protection or benefit accorded by law
but, in addition, must show that the legislative impact of the law is

reference to the Supreme Court on the application of s. 15 to a particular piece of legislation during
the three-year waiting period.
8
Andrews, supra, note 1.
9
Andrews was heard on October 5 and 6, 1989 by Dickson C.J.C., McIntyre, Lamer, Wilson, Le Dain, La Forest and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ. Justice Le Dain took no part in the judgment
which was rendered 16 months later on February 2, 1989. Id.
10
Id., at 174-75.
11
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed., supra, note 7, at 797-801.
12
Andrews, supra, note 1, at 179.
13
Id., at 180. Justice La Forest, concurring, left open the possibility that there might be room
under s. 15 for judicial intervention “beyond the traditionally established and analogous policies
against discrimination discussed by my colleague ….” Id., at 194.
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discriminatory.” Furthermore, under Andrews, any consideration of
reasonableness or of factors which could justify the discrimination takes place
at the section 1 stage.14 It is the fleshing out of the “discrimination” component
that would later divide and ensnare the Court.
The Andrews enumerated and analogous grounds approach was applied in
subsequent cases such as Turpin15 and McKinney.16 In each of these cases, the
Court applied Andrews and its inquiry focused on the question of whether the
impugned government action imposed a burden or denied a benefit on the basis
of an enumerated or analogous ground. The analysis in this respect was
straightforward and issues of justification, explanation or reasonableness of the
impugned classification were left, if at all, for section 1. For example, in
McKinney, La Forest J., writing for the majority, found that the University of
Guelph’s mandatory retirement policy was discriminatory within the meaning
of section 15(1) of the Charter since the distinction was based on the
enumerated personal characteristic of age. His analysis was succinct and direct,
taking little more than a paragraph. He found that there was no doubt that the
mandatory retirement policies imposed a burden on the employees at issue.
Next, he determined that mandatory retirement takes away the benefit of
working on the basis of the personal characteristic of age attributed to an
individual solely because of their association with a group (i.e. workers over
65).17
2. The Fragmentation of Equality: 1995-1999
Even during section 15’s early years, fissures had started to develop in the
Court’s interpretative approach to equality. Various members of the Court
added their own gloss to McIntyre J.’s directive in Andrews that a distinction
with respect to an enumerated or analogous group had to be “discriminatory.”
For example, in McKinney, Wilson J. writing in dissent, opined:
It follows, in my opinion, that the mere fact that the distinction drawn in this case
has been drawn on the basis of age does not automatically lead to some kind of
irrebuttable presumption of prejudice. Rather it compels one to ask the question: is
there prejudice? Is the mandatory retirement policy a reflection of the stereotype of
14

Id., at 182.
R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 (finding no discrimination under s. 15(1) where provisions of the Criminal Code treated persons charged with an offence in Alberta differently than
those charged with the same offence in Ontario; persons resident outside of Alberta charged with an
offence could not be considered a “discrete and insular” minority within the contemplation of s.
15(1) of the Charter).
16
McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafter “McKinney”].
17
Id., at 269.
15
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old age? Is there an element of human dignity at issue? Are academics being
required to retire at age 65 on the unarticulated premise that with age comes
increasing incompetence and decreasing intellectual capacity? I think the answer to
these questions is clearly yes and that s. 15 is accordingly infringed.18

These fissures erupted into chasms in the 1995 Equality Trilogy. In these
three cases released simultaneously on May 25, 1995 — Miron v. Trudel,19
Thibaudeau v. Canada,20 and Egan v. Canada21 — three distinct approaches to
section 15 emerged from the decisions of the Supreme Court. The first test, set
out by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Miron v. Trudel, focused on the
application of stereotypes:
The analysis under s. 15(1) involves two steps. First the claimant must show a
denial of “equal protection” or “equal benefit of the law, as compared to some other
person. Second, the claimant must show that the denial constitutes discrimination.
At this second stage, in order for discrimination to be made out, the claimant must
show that the denial rests on one of the grounds enumerated in s. 15(1) or an
analogous ground and that the unequal treatment is based on the stereotypical
application of presumed group or personal characteristics.22

In Egan, Cory J., writing for himself and Iacobucci J. (with Sopinka J.
expressing his agreement with their analysis), set out the test for a violation of
section 15(1) in slightly different terms. Their inquiry focused not on
“stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics” but
rather simply on distinctions that flow from “personal characteristics.” 23
Subsequently, Iacobucci J. referred to McLachlin J.’s “stereotypical
application” test and Cory J.’s “personal characteristics” test as “essentially
alike,” which was reflected by Cory, Sopinka, and Iacobucci JJ. concurring
with McLachlin J. in Miron.24
The second section 15(1) test was set out by Gonthier J. in Miron. It
followed McLachlin J.’s approach in that it also required that a distinction be
found and that this distinction constitute discrimination. However, in
determining what distinctions constitute discrimination, Gonthier J. added a
relevancy inquiry. In order for a violation of section 15(1) to be established
under Gonthier J.’s test, the grounds of the distinction must be irrelevant to the
purpose of the legislation. In other words, a denial of equality based on an

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id., at 393 (per Wilson J., dissenting).
Supra, note 2.
Id.
Id.
Miron, supra, note 2, at 485 (per McLachlin J.).
Egan, supra, note 2, at 597-99.
See Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358, at 390.
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enumerated or analogous ground would not in every case constitute
discrimination. Gonthier J. explained his reasoning in the following terms:
To the extent, then, that a law in any given case mirrors or reflects a distinction
drawn on such a basis that is relevant to its functional values which are not
themselves discriminatory, the distinction drawn by the law will not be
discriminatory.25

Finally, L’Heureux-Dubé J. set out a third approach in Miron. According to
this test, a distinction must first be proven to deny equality rights on the basis
of membership in an identifiable group, then that distinction must be shown to
be discriminatory. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé rejected the restriction of section 15
to enumerated and analogous grounds. Rather, her test weighed discrimination
on a case by case basis by considering (1) the nature of the group affected by
the distinction; and (2) the nature of the interest affected by the distinction.
Included as discriminatory were those distinctions
… capable of either promoting or perpetuating the view that the individual
adversely affected by this distinction is less capable, or less worthy of recognition
or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving
of concern, respect, and consideration.26

While failing to command the support of any of her colleagues at the time,
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s focus on context and dignity would prove highly
influential in the Supreme Court’s re-articulation of the equality test in Law v.
Canada.
The Supreme Court’s fragmentation on the interpretation of section 15
confounded courts and lawyers who were forced to analyze equality claims
under three different rubrics and attempt to synthesize the approaches in order
to reach some conclusion as to what the governing law from the Supreme Court
of Canada was. What emerged during the period between Andrews and Law
was “an inchoate mass of principles, tests, and methodologies.” 27

III. LAW’S PROMISE AND FAILURE
1. The Rule of Law: 1999-2001
Within a few years of the Equality Trilogy, it became apparent that the
continuation of a regime of fragmented approaches to section 15 was seriously
damaging any attempt to develop consistent or coherent jurisprudence in this

25
26
27

Miron, supra, note 2, at 436 (per Gonthier J.).
Miron, supra, note 2, at 465-77 (per L’Heureux-Dubé J.).
Cameron, supra, note 5, at 35.
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area. Lower court decisions became a guessing game as to how the three
different approaches would line up in any particular case. By 1998, when Law
v. Canada28 was heard at the Supreme Court, even that Court had apparently
come to the conclusion that the fragmentation of section 15 could not continue.
In what must have been a Herculean effort of judicial brokering, Justice
Iacobucci forged a new unanimous approach to section 15. Not surprisingly, the
“Law approach” combined features from all three separate strands of equality
interpretation.
The Supreme Court explained that in articulating a revised approach to the
interpretation of section 15(1), it was inappropriate to confine the analysis to a
“fixed and limited formula.” Instead, “[a] purposive and contextual approach to
discrimination is to be preferred, in order to permit the realization of the strong
remedial purpose of the equality guarantee, and to avoid the pitfalls of a
formalistic or mechanical approach.”29 The Court then unified its previous
jurisprudence, noting that its previous approaches to section 15(1) had focused
on three central issues:
(A)

whether a law imposes differential treatment between the claimant and
others, in purpose or effect;

(B)

whether one or more enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination
are the basis for the differential treatment; and

(C)

whether the law in question has a purpose or effect that is discriminatory
within the meaning of the equality guarantee.30

Justice Iacobucci then set out the template for courts to follow in
adjudicating discrimination claims under section 15(1). He instructed courts to
make the following three broad inquiries:
(A) Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics,
or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged
position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential
treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more
personal characteristics?
(B) Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more
enumerated and analogous grounds?
and
28
29
30

Supra, note 3.
Id., at para. 88.
Id.
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(C) Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon
or withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects
the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal
characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or
promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of
recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian
society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration? 31
Justice Iacobucci identified the purpose of section 15(1) as preventing the
violation of essential human dignity and freedom “through the imposition of
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a
society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or
as members of Canadian society, equally capable and deserving of respect and
consideration.”32
In the critical next step, Iacobucci J. stated that the existence of a conflict
between the purpose or effect of an impugned law and the purpose of section
15(1) was “essential” to a finding of discrimination under that section.
Moreover, determining whether such a conflict exists will henceforth require a
full contextual analysis surrounding both the claimant and the claim. Law’s
contextual approach also involves a comparative analysis where the claimant is
measured against the appropriate comparator group. 33 The list of contextual
factors are open and include such items as (1) pre-existing disadvantage;34 (2)
correspondence between the basis for the claim and the actual situation of the
claimant;35 (3) the ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law upon a
31

Id.
Id.
33
“The equality guarantee is a comparative concept, which ultimately requires a court to establish one or more relevant comparators. The claimant generally chooses the person, group, or
groups with whom he or she wishes to be compared for the purpose of the discrimination inquiry.
However, where the claimant’s characterization of the comparison is insufficient, a court may,
within the scope of the ground or grounds pleaded, refine the comparison presented by the claimant
where warranted. Locating the relevant comparison group requires an examination of the subjectmatter of the legislation and its effects, as well as a full appreciation of context.” Id.
34
“Pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, or vulnerability experienced by the
individual or group at issue. The effects of a law as they relate to the important purpose of s. 15(1)
in protecting individuals or groups who are vulnerable, disadvantaged, or members of ‘discrete and
insular minorities’ should always be a central consideration. Although the claimant’s association
with a historically more advantaged or disadvantaged group or groups is not per se determinative of
an infringement, the existence of these pre-existing factors will favour a finding that s. 15(1) has
been infringed.” Id.
35
“The correspondence, or lack thereof, between the ground or grounds on which the claim
is based and the actual need, capacity, or circumstances of the claimant or others. Although the
mere fact that the impugned legislation takes into account the claimant’s traits or circumstances will
32
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more disadvantaged group;36 and (4) the nature and scope of the interest
affected by the impugned law. 37
Ultimately, in Law, the Court found that the impugned provision of the
Canadian Pension Plan which reduces survivors’ pension benefits for surviving
spouses between 35 and 45 years of age and excludes them altogether for
surviving spouses under 35 years old, did not constitute discrimination within
the meaning of section 15(1) because neither the purpose nor the effect of the
impugned provision violated the claimant’s human dignity.
The Supreme Court applied the Law test with general agreement in the
subsequent cases of Corbière v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs),38 M. v. H.,39 and Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration).40 Importantly, in Lovelace v. Ontario,41 the Court eschewed a
separate step of analysis for affirmative action under section 15(2). Instead, the
Court rolled section 15(2) into the contextual mix under section 15(1). By
2002, however, the Law consensus began to show strains.
2. The Breakdown of the Rule of Law
In 2002, the Supreme Court’s united application of the Law test broke down,
revealing problems with Law’s methodology itself. First, in Lavoie v. Canada,42
four different opinions emerged in a challenge to the constitutionality of a
provision of the Public Service Employment Act, which affords preferential
treatment to Canadian citizens in the federal public service. 43 Second, in

not necessarily be sufficient to defeat a s. 15(1) claim, it will generally be more difficult to establish
discrimination to the extent that the law takes into account the claimant’s actual situation in a
manner that respects his or her value as a human being or member of Canadian society, and less
difficult to do so where the law fails to take into account the claimant’s actual situation.” Id.
36
“The ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law upon a more disadvantaged person or group in society. An ameliorative purpose or effect which accords with the purpose of s.
15(1) of the Charter will likely not violate the human dignity of more advantaged individuals where
the exclusion of these more advantaged individuals largely corresponds to the greater need or the
different circumstances experienced by the disadvantaged group being targeted by the legislation.
This factor is more relevant where the s. 15(1) claim is brought by a more advantaged member of
society.” Id.
37
“The more severe and localized the consequences of the legislation for the affected group,
the more likely that the differential treatment responsible for these consequences is discriminatory
within the meaning of s. 15(1).” Id.
38
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 [hereinafter “Corbière”].
39
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
40
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 703 [hereinafter “Granovsky”].
41
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, 2002 SCC 37 [hereinafter “Lovelace”].
42
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, 2002 SCC 23 [hereinafter “Lavoie”].
43
R.S.C. 1985, c. P-33, s. 16(4)(c).
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Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General),44 the Court split 5-4 on whether
Quebec welfare legislation, which provided reduced benefits for individuals
under the age of 30 who were not in job training programs, violated section
15(1) of the Charter.
In Lavoie, seven of the nine justices found that the impugned provision
violated section 15, but for two different reasons. Moreover, four of those seven
justices upheld the law under section 1 which meant that when coupled with the
two justices who did not find a section 15(1) violation, the impugned provision
was upheld by the Court 6-3. On one approach to section 15(1), Bastarache J.
(Gonthier, Iacobucci and Major JJ., concurring) held that the law imposed
differential treatment on the analogous ground of citizenship. He termed the
impugned preferences “substantive discrimination” because differentiating
between citizens and non-citizens was not based on individual capacity or
merit, but rather on a stereotypical differentiation that burdened an already
disadvantaged group. On another approach, McLachlin C.J.C. and L’HeureuxDubé J. (with Binnie J. concurring), also found that the law violated section 15,
but emphasized that it violated human dignity by forcing individuals who
sought employment from the public service to become citizens: “[t]he very act
of forcing some people to make such a choice violates human dignity, and is
therefore inherently discriminatory.” 45 Justice Arbour, writing for herself, found
no violation of section 15(1). She was sharply critical of Bastarache J.’s focus
on the subjective element to the human dignity inquiry, raising the alarm that it
threatened irrevocable damage to the Law methodology.46 Examining the
various contextual factors, Arbour J. concluded that the impugned law did not
violate essential human dignity and thus was not discriminatory within the
meaning of section 15(1). Justice LeBel concurred in Arbour J.’s assessment of
this issue.47
In Gosselin, decided in December 2002, the breakdown of the rule of Law
continued. The case involved a challenge to a Quebec regulation that provided
for reduced welfare benefits for individuals under 30 who were not
participating in training or work experience programs. 48 In a 5-4 decision, the
Supreme Court decided that the impugned regulation did not violate section
15(1).49 Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for herself and Gonthier, Iacobucci,
44

2002 SCC 84 [hereinafter “Gosselin”].
Lavoie, supra, note 42, at para. 5.
46
Id., at paras. 80-81 (per Arbour J.).
47
Id., at para. 124. He wrote separately to distance himself from Arbour J.’s comments regarding the application of s. 1. Id., at para. 125.
48
See Regulation Respecting Social Aid, R.R.Q. 1981, c. A-16, r. 1, s. 29(a).
49
A challenge to the impugned regulations was brought under both s. 7 and s. 15. The Court
held 7-2 that the regulations did not violate s. 7, with L’Heureux-Dubé and Arbour JJ., dissenting.
45
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Major, and Binnie JJ., held that the claimant had failed to discharge her burden
of proof under the third branch of the Law test. According to the Court, the
claimant had failed to demonstrate that the government treated her as less
worthy than older welfare recipients simply because it conditioned increased
payments on her participation in programs that were specifically designed to
integrate her into the workforce and to promote her long-term self-sufficiency.
The four dissenters took three different approaches to their collective
conclusion that the impugned regulation violated the claimant’s human dignity
and thus infringed her right to equality under section 15(1).50 Gosselin thus
provides four separate analyses under the Law test and four different
conceptions of the human dignity at issue in the case.
3. A Critique of Law
The Law methodology suffers from numerous problems, both practical and
principled.51 We focus on three: (i) the complexity and indeterminacy of the
Law methodology; (ii) Law’s usurpation of section 1’s role; and (iii) Law’s
creation of a “hierarchy of suffering.” 52
On the first point, a rather indicting critique was recently set out by Professor
Jamie Cameron:
Under the burden of layered and overlapping criteria, Charter analysis has become
less accessible, to the point at times of impenetrable. For instance, the question of
breach under section 15 is answered by a multi-step test, which incorporates
subdivisions and further guidelines. That side of the equation is then followed by
the several parts of the Oakes test, which is applied to determine whether limits are
justifiable. Yet with prolix, cumulative doctrines the probability that the boundaries
between breach and justification will blur can only crease. In addition, to escape the
needless convolution of such doctrines, the Court has inserted subjective criteria
into the mix. Co-existing alongside abstract doctrines in the jurisprudence are
perceptive concepts like context, vulnerability, and human dignity. More often than
not, those considerations, and not the even-handed application of a structured
methodology, determine the outcome. To summarize, the Court claims adherence
to a structured methodology and then employs result-oriented criteria to decide

50
The dissenters were united in their conclusion that the infringement of s. 15(1) was not
saved under s. 1 of the Charter.
51
Law is not without its defenders: see Donna Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of
Equality” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299 (concluding that while Law contains certain problems, the
framework it establishes is preferable to alternatives); Errol P. Mendes, “Taking Equality Into the
21st Century: Establishing the Concept of Equal Human Dignity” (2000-01) 12 N.J.C.L. 3 (lauding
“the dominant artistic vision” of “equal human dignity”).
52
Other criticisms of Law are contained in the articles referenced in note 5, supra.
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cases. Charter adjudication does not take place under a methodology but rather,
under the cover of methodology.53

Simply put, the Law methodology is overly complex and fails to articulate a
workable standard that can be applied with any degree of objectivity: “its
criteria are long-winded, intertwined, abstract, and yet, as the Court cautioned,
not exhaustive at that. … Law has confirmed that adding layers upon layers of
doctrinal criteria does not lend precision to the decision making process.” 54
Law’s open-ended multi-factor test fails to provide trial judges with sufficient
tools to balance various considerations, and fails to instruct judges how all the
various factors are to be added up in order to reach a reasoned rather than adhoc or results-oriented conclusion.55 The indeterminacy of Law undermines the
rule of law.56
For all its complexity, the Law methodology seems to boil down to a single
inquiry: does the impugned provision violate human dignity? Human dignity is
a hopelessly abstract concept. While objectivity could likely be reached on a
few core aspects of human dignity such as the right to be free from torture,
venturing beyond this small core becomes hazy and subjective very quickly.57
The problem with human dignity is that it says nothing more specific about the
content of section 15 than it does about any other section of the Charter. Human
dignity “underlies the entire Charter and therefore cannot serve to differentiate
equality rights from other Charter rights. If anything … ‘dignity belongs more
to the realm of individual rights than to group based historical disadvantage.’” 58
Second, the Law methodology usurps the role of section 1. Under Law, the
purpose of the legislation is considered at both the section 15 and the section 1

53

Cameron, supra, note 5, at 32.
Id., at 35.
55
Professor Greschner has defended the complexity and subjectivity of Law on the grounds
that discrimination is a complex concept: “An effective approach [to s. 15] will be complex because
the phenomenon of inequality is complex. It is well to remember the old adage: for every complex
problem, there is a simple answer, and it is always wrong.” Greschner, supra, note 51, at 317-18.
We are mindful of the complexity of the issue. Our response is that these complex issues should be
determined, at the s. 1 stage where the government bears the burden of demonstrating whether the
impugned provision or program is justifiable.
56
On the meaning and importance of the Rule of Law, see Reference re Resolution to amend
the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, at 805-06 [hereinafter “Patriation Reference”] and Reference
re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 70 [hereinafter “Quebec Secession Reference”].
57
“While it may be easier to determine when human dignity is demeaned, it will be more
difficult to articulate why it is not.” Martin, supra, note 5, at 329. Even one of Law’s few defenders
acknowledges that Law’s focus on human dignity is misplaced. See Greschner, supra, note 51, at
312-13 (“Dignity becomes an assertion, not an analysis.”).
58
Greschner, supra, note 51, at 312 quoting Martin, supra, note 5, at 329.
54
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stage. As well, the test articulated by the Court for the determination of
“discrimination” under section 15(1) contains many of the same elements found
in the proportionality part of the section 1 analysis. Finally, the heavy reliance
on “context” in section 1 is matched by the Court’s insistence on “context” in
the application of the section 1 test.59 The effect of this overlap is to create a
repetitive test which, as applied, tends to strip section 1 of any meaningful role.
At least one member of the Court has acknowledged this problem. 60 What the
Court has called “purposive interpretation” in defining the right under section
15, is in fact an exercise in the determination of the reasonableness of the
classification at issue. Under Law, justification takes place under the guise of
purposive interpretation.
Finally, certain aspects of the Law methodology are highly problematic. For
instance, the focus on the comparator group and the history of discrimination
and disadvantage creates a “race to the bottom.” In the quest to be measured
against the appropriate comparator group, a claimant is required to prove that
his or her group is more disadvantaged that the comparator group lest they find
themselves in the situation of the temporarily disabled claimant in Granovsky,
informed by the Court that he is better off, compared with the permanently
disabled. This analysis invites the creation of a hierarchy of suffering.

IV. KEY PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY ANALYSIS
In developing a framework for the analysis of equality claims under the
Charter, there are essentially four elements that must be considered: (a) the
classification; (b) the purpose of the legislation; (c) the effect of the legislation;
and (d) the reasonableness of the classification in the context of the legislation.
These principles are not controversial; they can be found in the Supreme
Court’s equality jurisprudence from Andrews to Law. The issue is at what stage
of the Charter inquiry — breach or justification — each factor should be
considered. These elements constitute the background principles for
consideration of any framework for analysis under section 15.
1. Classifications
Classifications matter. Common sense tells us that we should be more
concerned about some classifications than others. Our response would differ to
a tax imposed by the government on members of a particular racial group than

59
60

Bredt & Nishisato, supra, note 5. See also Bredt & Dodek, supra, note 5, at 181-82.
See Gosselin, supra, note 44, at para. 244 (per Bastarache J.).

Job name: SCLR vol 20

CRA

Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012

Breaking the Law’s
Grip on Equality

(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d)

47

it would to a tax imposed on coffee drinkers. 61 Classification mattered to the
drafters of the Charter who made the choice to enumerate certain classifications
in section 15. It certainly mattered to members of groups who were enumerated
in section 15 who thought their inclusion under that section indicated some
level of constitutional protection. Classification mattered to groups excluded
from section 15 who fought vigorously for the inclusion of additional
classifications, some successfully (e.g., disability) and some unsuccessfully
(e.g., sexual orientation). No test under section 15 can ignore the text of the
Charter that gives credence to certain classifications. The use of classifications
reflects the belief that a conception of equality grows out of the experience of
discrimination against particular vulnerable groups in society and the collective
feeling of uneasiness about using certain classifications in legislation. 62
2. Purpose of the Legislation
All legislation creates classifications. An important step in the equality
analysis must therefore be an analysis of the purpose of the legislation. This
step will seek to determine what the legislation is trying to accomplish and
61
The problem of “adverse effects” or “constructive discrimination” is discussed below in
the section on the Effect of the Law.
62
There is nothing novel about the concern with classifications in the Charter; it has become
an international phenomenon, since at least the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the
“Universal Declaration”) in 1948. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides, in pertinent part: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Constitutional bills of rights such
as the Charter tend to be concerned about classifications and manifest this concern in different
ways. Modern bills of rights tend to follow the example of the Universal Declaration and expressly
enumerate certain classifications that are constitutionally protected. For example, the South African
Bill of Rights (1996) which was strongly influenced by the Charter, provides in its equality section
that: “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour,
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.” Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, s. 8(3). The New Zealand Bill of Rights,
while not a constitutional bill of rights, takes a similar approach. See New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act of 1990, s. 19, as amended (“Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the
grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993.”) (The Human Rights Act 1993 enumerates specific prohibited grounds of discrimination). See “Freedom from Discrimination” in Paul
Rishworth et al., eds., The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003). An older bill of rights, such as the American which does not expressly enumerate
classifications, uses classifications through the development of different levels of scrutiny for
“suspect”, “semi-suspect” and “non-suspect” classes. As noted by the Chief Justice of Canada, we
can learn from the experience of other countries in interpreting our own Constitution. McLachlin,
supra, note 4, at 27.
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make a judgment about the importance of the legislative objective. Some
legislative purposes are pedestrian whereas others may be critical to the wellbeing of the nation. There is a difference, in short, between legislation that
authorizes spending for road repair and legislation that declares martial law in
time of war. Some transparent discussion of the purpose of the legislation is
necessary in all equality analyses.
3. Effect of the Law
The effect of the legislation is relevant in two respects. First, it is relevant in
the sense of the interests being affected by the legislation in question. There is a
difference between the imposition of a height and weight requirement as a job
requirement and its imposition at a carnival ride. Leaving aside issues of
reasonableness, the effect of the height and weight requirement in the first
instance is more severe because employment is a much more important interest
than the opportunity to go on a carnival ride. Any equality test must give some
consideration to the interests at stake.
The effect of the legislation is relevant in the second respect in terms of its
impact on particular classifications. Laws may explicitly invoke “suspect”
classifications, but many laws may use one form of classification that has an
“adverse impact” on other classifications. For example, imposing a requirement
that firefighter candidates must be at least six feet tall and 200 pounds in weight
imposes a classification on its face relating to height and weight. However, it
may be demonstrated, through empirical data, that these height and weight
requirements have an adverse impact on other classifications which are more
suspect than height and weight, such as sex or race.
4. Reasonableness of the Classification
Determining the reasonableness of the classification in the context of the
legislation in issue is the most important and the most difficult part of the
equality analysis. It also contains the greatest aspect of subjectivity: reasonable
people will disagree on the reasonableness of the use of particular
classifications in various contexts.63 Given the inescapable subjectivity of this
inquiry, it is important that the reasonableness inquiry be as transparent as
possible in order to protect the courts’ legitimacy. There are a number of

63
We believe that Law’s human dignity analysis is an overly complex means of layering this
inquiry into reasonableness. Cases such as Lavoie and Gosselin can be reduced to a difference of
opinion among members of the Court as to the reasonableness of considering citizenship for public
service jobs (Lavoie) and of using age to restrict welfare benefits (Gosselin).
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factors that the courts have often considered, but which are not always
expressly identified as relevant factors in the reasonableness inquiry. These
include: (i) whether the legislation is over or underinclusive; and (ii) the nature
of the classification. These should be identified and addressed by courts
directly in an open and frank manner. We discuss these two factors in more
detail below.
(a) Over- and Underinclusive Legislation
The first consideration is whether the impugned legislation is over- or
underinclusive. In an influential 1949 law review article which has been (in our
view unfairly,)64 maligned because it was seen as the genesis of the “similarlysituated” test, Tussman and tenBroek explain the relationship between the
purpose of the legislation and the classifications used by the law. 65 There are
five possible relationships between the class defined by the legislation’s
purpose and the class defined by the trait identified in any legislation:
(i) There can be complete overlap between the purpose of the legislation
and those affected by it, and vice-versa; in Oakes’66 terms, the “least restrictive means” has been used to achieve a perfect fit between the objective of the law and the means chosen;
(ii) There can be complete asymmetry between the objective of the legislation and those affected by it, and vice versa; in Oakes’ terms, there is no
“rational connection” between the objective and the means chosen;
(iii) The legislation is underinclusive because it applies only to
a subset of the group that falls within the purpose of the legislation;
(iv) The legislation is overinclusive because it applies to a larger group than
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the legislation; and
(v) The legislation is both overinclusive and underinclusive because in classifying the group covered by the legislation it both overshoots and undershoots its purpose.

64

This view is shared by the Court of Appeal for Ontario. See Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. S. (T.) (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 189, at 205-206 (C.A.).
65
See Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, “The Equal Protection of the Laws” (194849) 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341. We believe that many of the ideas proffered by Tussman and tenBroek
continue to maintain strong empirical and normative force despite attempts by courts and commentators to disassociate themselves from the “similarly-situated” enquiry. We believe that their ideas
of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness have always been part of equality analysis in Canada
and are a necessary but not sufficient part of any reasonableness inquiry.
66
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter “Oakes”].
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These concepts are best understood through concrete examples. Consider the
situation where the state determines to legislate qualifications for firefighters. It
needs firefighters to have a certain minimum strength in order to be able to haul
heavy equipment and carry people out of burning buildings. As a result of its
experience, the state knows that it needs its firefighters to have the capacity to
carry a 200 pound object over 50 metres. It also knows that statistical evidence
shows that most people who are six feet tall or over and weigh at least 200
pounds will be able to complete this task. If the state sets a requirement that
“All firefighter candidates must be able to carry at least 250 pounds over 50
metres”, this law will be underinclusive because while everyone within the
group will meet the purpose of the law, there will be others (who can carry
between 200 and 249 pounds over 50 metres) who will be excluded but meet
the target or purpose of the law. If the requirement is changed to, “All
firefighter candidates must be able to carry at least 150 pounds over 50 metres”
it becomes overinclusive because it will include everyone who can meet the
purpose of the law (200 pounds over 50 metres), but it will also include others
who cannot (150-199 pounds over 50 metres). The requirement may be both
underinclusive and overinclusive at the same time, consider: “All Firefighter
candidates must be at least six feet in height and 200 pounds in weight.” This is
underinclusive, because it excludes those people who do not meet the
requirements but who are actually capable of meeting the law’s purpose, i.e., of
carrying 200 pounds over 50 metres. It is also overinclusive because it will
include some people who meet the height and weight requirement but who are
not able to meet the law’s purpose of carrying 200 pounds over 50 metres.
When the requirement is changed to “All firefighter candidates must be able to
carry at least 200 pounds over 50 metres” then it accords perfectly with its
purpose.
Generally, we consider underinclusiveness to be more reasonable than
overinclusiveness on the grounds that the legislature should be given some
latitude in addressing a social problem in a step-by-step approach and not be
forced to address the entire problem at first instance, lest it never actually do so.
Underinclusiveness is especially tolerated when it comes to government
spending and benefits; cases like Granovsky are better explained in terms of
tolerance for underinclusiveness in government benefit programs than by any
recourse to human dignity.
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(b) Nature of Classification
In determining reasonableness, the nature of the classification is also an
important factor.67 We believe that it is implicit in the Supreme Court’s
decisions in cases such as McKinney,68 Law69 and Gosselin70 that discrimination
on the basis of age is more reasonable than discrimination on the basis of other
grounds, such as race or religion. However, it is important that this implicit
assumption be expressly acknowledged and justified. Distinctions based on age
are more reasonable because they impact all members of society, although not
at the same point in time. Classifications based on age are only unequal when
one looks at them at a specific point in time. However, when examined over the
course of a lifetime, all members of society are potentially subject to such
classifications, which mitigates potential unfairness to some degree. 71 In this
sense, age is not immutable in the same way that race, colour or national origin
are. Classifications based on those latter grounds impose a “legislative tax” on a
select portion of the population that will never be shared by its other
members.72 The “unfairness” of distinctions based on age is more fairly
distributed throughout the population than distinctions based on other
classifications.
As noted at the outset, all of these factors are already part of the Supreme
Court’s approach to the interpretation of section 15(1). The next part of the
paper considers how they should be distributed between section 15(1) and
section 1.

67

American jurisprudence makes this explicit through different “levels of scrutiny.”
Supra, note 16.
69
Supra, note 3.
70
Supra, note 44.
71
Thus, restrictions that impose minimum ages to vote, drive or purchase alcohol are burdens that all members of society will share in. Similarly, age restrictions imposed on persons aged
65 and beyond are burdens in which all members of society will share.
72
We have taken this idea from Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law (New York:
Vintage Books, 1997), at 158-61. Professor Kennedy explains racial profiling in policing in terms
of the imposition of a “racial tax” on certain minority groups. For example, “When a MexicanAmerican motorist is selected for questioning in part on the basis of his perceived ancestry, he is
undoubtedly being burdened more heavily at that moment on account of his race than his white
Anglo counterpart. He is being made to pay a type of racial tax for the campaign against illegal
immigration, that whites, blacks, and Asians escape. Similarly, a young black man selected for
questioning by police as he alights from an airplane or drives a car is being made to pay a type of
racial tax for the war against drugs that whites and other groups escape. That tax is the cost of being
subjected to greater scrutiny than others.” Id., at 158-59.
68
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V. A RENEWED APPROACH TO SECTION 15
For the reasons set out in part III, the Law framework is both unworkable in
practice and undesirable in principle, and should be abandoned. Instead, we
argue in favour of a return to a modified version of the Andrews test. In this
approach, the issue of the reasonableness of the classification in the context of
the legislation is reserved for section 1. The inquiry under section 15 thus
becomes a much simpler determination of whether the classification in question
is based on an enumerated or analogous ground and whether it creates a
disadvantage.73
1. The Question of Breach — Section 15(1) Analysis
(a) The Two-Step Approach
In the modified Andrews approach that we propose, the inquiry of whether
there is a breach under section 15 of the Charter would be restricted to a twopart test: (1) does the legislation have either the purpose or effect of
distinguishing between the claimant and others based on an enumerated or
analogous ground; and (2) does that distinction disadvantage the claimant? If
the answer to both these questions is yes, then the matter proceeds to section 1
for a consideration of whether the prima facie infringement of section 15 is
justified as a “reasonable limitation” on equality rights.
This proposed approach restricts the application of section 15 to enumerated
and analogous grounds. In section (c) of this part, we explain the basis for this.
We note that if it is established that the legislation has the purpose or effect of
distinguishing between the plaintiff and others on an enumerated ground or on
the basis of an acknowledged analogous ground (such as citizenship or sexual
orientation), all that is left for the claimant to establish in order to proceed to
section 1 is that the legislation disadvantages members of the
enumerated/analogous ground.
(b) Analogous Grounds
If the claimant seeks to found a claim based on an analogous ground that has
not been previously recognized, the claimant will carry the burden of
establishing that the court should recognize a particular classification as

73

We have consciously avoided discussion of the role of s. 15(2) in this paper. The special
considerations of s. 15(2) necessitate detailed consideration which is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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analogous to those that are enumerated under section 15(1).74 The Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence in this area is helpful and should be followed. According
to the Court, an analogous ground is one that is based on “a personal
characteristic that is immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to
personal identity.”75 In Andrews, La Forest J., in recognizing citizenship as an
analogous ground, stated as follows: “The characteristic of citizenship is one
typically not within the control of the individual and, in this sense, is
immutable. Citizenship is, at least temporarily, a characteristic of personhood
not alterable by conscious action and in some cases not alterable except on the
basis of unacceptable costs.”76 The Court has also emphasized that historical
disadvantage is an important factor to consider in determining an analogous
ground.77
(c) The Limited Notion of Disadvantage
The determination of “disadvantage” at the breach step should be a limited
and primarily factual inquiry. In Andrews, McIntyre J. rightly concluded that
section 15(1) was designed to prevent discrimination based on the enumerated
and analogous grounds.78 In subsequent cases, various justices seized on
McIntyre J.’s use of the term “discrimination” in order to construct additional
qualifiers on the section 15 inquiry. While invoking Andrews, these subsequent
decisions strayed from the limitations imposed by McIntyre J. on the
discrimination inquiry.79
We have used the word “disadvantage” because of the loaded nature of the
term “discrimination” and the extent to which it has been used after Andrews to
embark on what are essentially inquiries into the reasonableness of the
classification at issue. However, we agree with what McIntyre J. envisioned at
74

For a good discussion of the characteristics of the enumerated grounds, see Peter W.
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), at s. 52.7(c) [hereinafter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf-ed.].
75
Corbière, supra, note 38, at para. 13 (per McLachlin and Bastarache JJ., for the majority).
76
Andrews, supra, note 1, at 195 (per La Forest J.).
77
See Egan, supra, note 2, at 498 (per McLachlin J., Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci JJ., concurring).
78
Andrews, supra, note 1, at 180.
79
According to Professor Cameron, “Andrews left unresolved whether a classification based
on prohibited grounds would establish a breach, or whether section 15 required proof, in addition,
that the classification was discriminatory. The possibility that the prohibited grounds might not
suffice created new opportunities for section 1’s function to invade section 15.” Cameron, supra,
note 5, at 34. We agree with Professor Cameron that Andrews left this possibility open; however,
for the reasons described above, we believe that the discrimination inquiry envisioned by Andrews
was a limited one which did not invade the province of s. 1.
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the
breach
step
in
determination
of
whether
there
was
discrimination/disadvantage for the purposes of section 15(1). As McIntyre J.
explained the term, the discrimination inquiry under section 15(1) is a limited
one. It is restricted to determining whether the impugned distinction “has the
effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual
group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to
opportunities, benefits or advantages available to other members of society.” 80
In short, the discrimination inquiry under section 15(1) is restricted to
determining a prima facie disadvantage. This should not involve a detailed
objective/subjective inquiry into whether a reasonable person considering all
the circumstances of the claimant would consider that the distinction was
discriminatory in a purposive sense or whether the distinction impairs human
dignity. Such inquiries are all thinly-veiled attempts at justification which are
properly the subject of section 1.
(d) Disadvantage in Purpose or Effect
Legislation that clearly disadvantages the claimant on the basis of an
enumerated and analogous ground will make it relatively simple for the
claimant to establish a prima facie breach and proceed to section 1: “No women
may be firefighters.” However, much discrimination is subtler and is the result
of the discriminatory impact of a facially-neutral provision on a class: “All
firefighters must be at least six feet tall and weigh at least 200 pounds.” In the
last example, the proposed legislation may have an adverse impact on members
of an enumerated group, such as sex or race. In this instance, the claimant will
be required to adduce evidence to carry the burden of proof of demonstrating
that the impugned legislation has the effect of creating a disadvantage based on
an enumerated or analogous ground. This should be primarily a factual inquiry
and not involve normative considerations as to the legislation’s reasonableness.
2. The Question of Justification — Section 1 Analysis
At the section 1 stage, the government bears the burden of justifying that the
impugned provision is a “reasonable limitation” in a free and democratic
society. It is at this stage that it is proper for the court to make all
determinations as to the reasonableness of the legislative classification in the
context of the purpose of the legislation. There are three essential components
to justification under section 1: (i) an inquiry into the purpose of the legislation;
80

Id., at 174.
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(ii) a review of the classification in question; and (iii) a determination of how
closely tailored the classification is to the purpose of the legislation.
(a) Purpose of the Legislation
In considering the purpose of the legislation, the court should inquire into
what it is that the legislation is seeking to accomplish and how important that
objective is. It should be acknowledged that not all purposes are “pressing and
substantial,” yet the government may ultimately be able to demonstrably justify
a limit as “reasonable” in a free and democratic society on the strength of other
factors. The purpose of a restriction on washrooms to “Men” and “Women” is
difficult to articulate as “pressing and substantial.” The government should be
forced to articulate the importance of its legislative objective or administrative
rule and courts should be required to classify the importance of the purpose as
“ordinary,” “important” or “pressing and substantial.”
(b) The Classification in Question
The Oakes test is not particularly well-suited for this inquiry and should be
modified to expressly acknowledge what the Court has implicitly accepted:
different classifications will attract varying degrees of deference. It is extremely
difficult to imagine the Court giving much deference to classifications based on
race whereas the Court has demonstrated a high degree of deference for
classifications based on age.81 These different standards of scrutiny should be
expressly articulated by the Court.
(c) The Question of Fit
The court should consider how appropriate the classification is in connection
to the purpose of the legislation. Consideration should be given to whether the
legislation extends a benefit or imposes a burden and whether the legislation is
underinclusive or overinclusive. For the reasons given above, underinclusive
legislation will often be easier to justify than overinclusive legislation.
3. Rationales and Response to Critics
The approach proposed, which requires classifications based on enumerated
and analogous grounds to show only a disadvantage and leaves to section 1 the
question of the reasonableness of the classification, is supported by (i) the text
81

See discussion in parts II and III, supra, regarding McKinney, Law, and Gosselin.
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and history of the Charter; (ii) the structure of the Charter; and (iii) the
importance of greater transparency and clarity to the rule of law.
(a) Respect for the Text
Our proposed approach gives pride of place to the grounds enumerated in the
text of section 15 and those that are “analogous” to them. It is submitted that
certainly some weight must be given to the text of section 15 which expressly
enumerates certain grounds of discrimination. The focus on enumerated and
analogous grounds under section 15(1) accords with the constitutional history
and purpose of this section. Section 15 was not enacted in a vacuum. As has
been recognized repeatedly, a constitutional right to equality was enshrined in
the Charter against the backdrop of the perceived failures of the Canadian Bill
of Rights and the history of discrimination in this country against specific
groups. In the public hearings before the Special Joint Committee, equalityseeking groups testified about concrete experiences of discrimination that they
had experienced or faced in Canadian society for which they sought a remedy
in section 15; they did not seek a means that would require them to convince
courts that their human dignity was being impaired on a case-by-case basis.82 In
short, having fought to be specifically included under section 15, members of
equality-seeking groups should not have to establish a prime facie violation of
section 15 anew in each equality case. 83 The reference to discrimination in
82

In an impassioned testimony before the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution, David Lepofsky on behalf of the Canadian National Institute of the Blind, detailed concrete examples
of legislative distinctions against the handicapped which disadvantaged them. Similarly, representatives of the Canadian Black community and the Japanese-Canadian community spoke of their
experiences with discrimination. Simply put, in interpreting the Charter, one must take account of
the history of discrimination in Canada against particular groups: the internment of Japanese
Canadians; the persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Quebec, the treatment of the Chinese in
British Columbia and the imposition of the head tax.
83
We cannot put the issue better than Mr. Wilson Head who as President of the National
Black Coalition of Canada testified as follows before the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution:
… in the final analysis it should be up to the government itself to say why certain
rights are abrogated. It should not be up to the people to have to continue to fight for the
rights, the government should confer these rights in a very general sense on the one hand,
but specific on another, and at the same time say that if the government wishes to restrict
these rights in any way, let the government make the case; that the burden of proof be upon
the government to make the case that these rights ought to be abrogated.
Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate
and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 1st session of the 32d Parliament,
1980-81, 22:11 (December 9, 1980) [hereinafter “Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee on
the Constitution”].
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section 15 should also be understood in light of the development of human
rights acts which protected against discrimination on various enumerated
grounds. Section 15 was largely modelled after these acts. 84
Moreover, our argument for a return to a limited Andrews-like approach to
breach is supported by the text of section 15(2) which provides that
“Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” The use of
the term “disadvantaged” in section 15(2) supports the interpretation of
“discrimination” that we propose for section 15(1).
(b) Structure of the Charter
A limited inquiry under section 15(1) also accords with the constitutional
structure of the Charter. Numerous scholars have written about the structure of
the Charter and its separation of rights and limits.85 Interpretive theories should
respect the text’s separation between “breach and justification.” 86
To date, the Court has not lent sufficient credence to the burden placed on
government to justify limitations on rights under section 1. In part, this is due to
the Court painting itself into a corner through the rigidity of the Oakes analysis.
Every section 15(1) analysis is undertaken with the sword of Oakes hanging
over a court’s head which, if minimal impairment is to be taken seriously, is
likely to torpedo most limitations on equality. The judicial response has been to
use the malleable concepts of “substantive equality,” discrimination and human
dignity to sidestep Oakes. However, this interpretive choice has profoundly
negative consequences for Charter adjudication.
The purpose and the logic of the Charter requires governments to justify
limitations on Charter rights. “Any test of discrimination which asks whether
the differential treatment is reasonable or unreasonable, permissible or
impermissible, is another way of inquiring whether it is justifiable or not.” 87
Importing any justification criteria into section 15 requires the rights claimant
to prove that the limit is not justified — in essence to prove a negative. Not
only is this logically problematic but it presents the rights claimant with a
daunting evidentiary task. In cases of adverse effects discrimination, a rights
84

Andrews, supra, note 1, at 172.
See e.g. Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 of the Charter” (1988) 10 Sup. Ct. L. Rev., 469; Cameron, supra, note 5; and Bredt & Dodek, supra, note 5.
86
Professor Cameron has recently written about the Supreme Court’s infidelity to the structural logic of the Charter. See Cameron, supra, note 5.
87
Cameron, supra, note 5, at 35.
85
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claimant under section 15 will be required to demonstrate to the court that the
impugned legislation has a discriminatory effect on an enumerated or
analogous group. This will likely require detailed empirical evidence that is
able to demonstrate the legislation’s impact on a particular class of individuals.
This in itself is a difficult task for a prospective litigant. However, the challenge
is compounded when the litigant is required to adduce evidence under the Law
methodology to prove a violation of human dignity, including evidence of
historic disadvantage, stereotyping, correspondence between the basis for the
claim and the actual situation of the claimant; the ameliorative purpose or
effects of the impugned legislation upon a more disadvantaged group; and the
nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned legislation. Moreover,
because the list of contextual factors is open-ended, the rights claimant, while
having the opportunity to adduce additional evidence, may be faced with other
“contextual factors” for which she has not developed evidence. The claimant
may not even know the case he or she is to meet in order to prove his or her
claim.
(c) Transparency, Clarity, and the Rule of Law
The modified Andrews approach attempts to inject greater transparency in
the analysis of equality claims by clearly identifying a more limited number of
objective factors for the court to consider and by discarding hopelessly
subjective concepts such as “human dignity.” In transferring all considerations
of reasonableness from the breach to the justification stage, this approach also
heightens government accountability. The modified Andrews approach
proposed in this paper thus establishes a framework that is easier for equality
claimants and their lawyers to understand and for courts to apply.
Transparency, clarity, and greater predictability are the essence of the rule of
law.88
(d) Response to Critics
The enumerated and analogous grounds approach upon which our modified
Andrews approach is based has been attacked on the grounds that it is

88
The rule of law is “a highly textured expression, importing many things … but conveying,
for example, a sense of orderliness, of subjection to known legal rules and of executive accountability to legal authority.” See Patriation Reference, supra, note 56, at 805-06. In the Quebec Secession
Reference, supra, note 56, the Court explained that “[a]t its most basic level the rule of law vouchsafes to the citizens and residents of the country a stable, predictable and ordered society in which
to conduct their affairs.” Id., at para. 70.
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formalistic and inconsistent with substantive equality.89 We disagree because
we do not believe that a consensus exists as to the meaning of substantive
equality. This is demonstrated by the cases following Law in which the
Supreme Court has been sharply divided on this issue. Support for substantive
equality simply does not assist in establishing a workable framework for
adjudication of section 15 claims.
As to the charge of formalism, we acknowledge that in attempting to
articulate a more objective test, our approach is both under-inclusive and overinclusive. However, for all the reasons set out above, we believe that this is
preferable to the unbridled subjectivity of Law and of the abstract and uncertain
principles propounded by the proponents of substantive equality.
A modified Andrews approach is under-inclusive in the sense that it does not
catch all “discrimination,” but only that on enumerated or analogous grounds.
Essentially, this gives the legislature a license to discriminate on all other bases.
We accept this and acknowledge that discrimination in the neutral sense of the
term is the business of legislating. If, as some have argued, 90 all legislation that
discriminates in the sense of drawing a distinction between classes of people
should be held to violate section 15(1) and require justification under section 1,
then every single piece of legislation would be susceptible to a Charter
challenge.91 This would import an aspect of American equal protection analysis
that does not accord with our constitutional history.92

89
See Greschner, supra, note 51, at 308 and Douglas Kropp, “ ‘Categorical’ Failure: Canada’s Equality Jurisprudence — Changing Notions of Identity and the Legal Subject” (1997) 21
Queen’s L.J. 201.
90
See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed., supra, note 7, at 797-801; and Cameron, supra, note 5, at 40.
91
Professor Hogg noted that virtually any benefit programs were susceptible to a charge of
underinclusiveness. See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1992), at 911-12.
92
Under such a framework, one would have to begin to articulate a purpose for s. 15 that focused far more on individuals and their interaction with government than on historicallydisadvantaged or discriminated-against groups. One would have to articulate a purpose that argues
that government must be absolutely neutral in its dealings with all citizens. While such a libertarian
argument may be philosophically defensible, it does not accord with the history of the Canadian
state and the role of government, let alone with the “Trudeau vision” of a “Just Society” fuelled by
undisciplined government spending and intervention in all aspects of society. See generally Andrew
Coyne, “Social Spending, taxes, and the Debt: Trudeau’s Just Society” in Andrew Cohen & J.L.
Granatstein, eds., Trudeau’s Shadow (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 1998), at 223; Thomas
S. Axworthy & Pierre Eliott Trudeau, Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau Years (Toronto:
Viking, 1990); and Stephen Clarkson & Christina McCall, Trudeau and Our Times: Volume 2: The
Heroic Delusion (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1994). The idea of absolute state neutrality
would be anathema to many of the persons who were the driving force behind the
constitutionalization of a bill of rights for Canada.
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The modified Andrews approach is also over-inclusive in the sense that some
distinctions which are considered acceptable in society will meet both
components of the section 15(1) test and be held to be prima facie
discriminatory. We see this as an issue for section 1, not for section 15(1).
Requiring the government to justify all distinctions based on enumerated and
analogous grounds is desirable. It forces government to articulate reasons for
long-held policies which may or may not change over time.
We do not believe that the Oakes test should be used to straightjacket the
interpretation of section 15. Fear that the rigidity of the Oakes test will result in
much legislation being struck down or in the Oakes test being watered-down is
overstated. The practical reality is that Oakes is not monolithic — for example,
the Supreme Court applies a much different Oakes test when it considers a
commercial expression claim under section 2(b) than it does when considering
a criminal defendant’s rights under section 11. Explicit recognition or
reconsideration of different applications of section 1 by the Court would also be
welcome.
Our hope is to inject greater transparency into the adjudication of equality
claims under section 15 by forcing courts to make explicit many assumptions
that have heretofore been implicit and allowed to be buried under layer upon
layer of “context.”

VI. CONCLUSION
In this difficult and controversial area of the law, we make no pretensions of
having found the Rosetta Stone to unlocking equality. However, we do believe
that a modified Andrews approach based on the principles and the framework
set out in Andrews is a preferable approach to what has developed since.
Focusing on concepts such as substantive equality and human dignity at the
section 15(1) stage is a hopelessly abstract and subjective enterprise which is
well-suited to legislative policy discussions and philosophy classes, but not to
the process of adjudication. Sometimes additional attempts to tweak the picture
makes the whole screen more fuzzy. As Peter Hogg noted in commenting on
post-Andrews jurisprudence, “[t]here is nothing wrong with this picture and I
am at a loss to discover why the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada,
having painted it so successfully in Andrews, have been struggling so hard to
blur it ever since.”93

93

Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf ed., supra, note 74, at para. 52.7(b).
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